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Naive Bayesian Learning in Social Networks
JERRY ANUNROJWONG, Harvard University, USA
NAT SOTHANAPHAN, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
The DeGroot model of naive social learning assumes that agents only communicate scalar opinions. In prac-
tice, agents communicate not only their opinions, but their confidence in such opinions. We propose a model
that captures this aspect of communication by incorporating signal informativeness into the naive social
learning scenario. Our proposed model captures aspects of both Bayesian and naive learning. Agents in our
model combine their neighbors’ beliefs using Bayes’ rule, but the agents naively assume that their neighbors’
beliefs are independent. Depending on the initial beliefs, agents in our model may not reach a consensus,
but we show that the agents will reach a consensus under mild continuity and boundedness assumptions
on initial beliefs. This eventual consensus can be explicitly computed in terms of each agent’s centrality and
signal informativeness, allowing joint effects to be precisely understood. We apply our theory to adoption
of new technology. In contrast to Banerjee et al. [5], we show that information about a new technology can
be seeded initially in a tightly clustered group without information loss, but only if agents can expressively
communicate their beliefs.
1 INTRODUCTION
This paper introduces an intuitive naive social learning model that extends the DeGroot model
when agents are differently informed. In standard naive learning, each agent’s belief is a scalar,
and each agent updates her beliefs by taking the weighted averages of her neighbors’ beliefs with
fixed weights. This implicitly assumes that every agent’s signal quality is the same, which is often
not true in practice. We propose a solution to this problem by representing each agent’s belief as
a probability distribution over possible states of the world. Signal quality can then be naturally
communicated by using Bayes’ rule to combine one’s belief with the beliefs of one’s neighbors.
For example, if an agent has a scalar opinion µ and a scalar confidence τ indicating how sure she
is of that scalar opinion, her belief can be represented by the Gaussian N(µ, 1/τ ). Our model can
also accommodate other forms of information. For example, an agent may believe that either one
of the two values is very likely, while other values are less likely. This belief can be represented as
a double-peaked distribution, but it cannot be represented in standard DeGroot models.
It is known separately in Bayesian learning and naive learning literatures that higher quality
signals and more centrally located agents, respectively, have more influence in social learning. The
innovation in our model is to introduce signal quality into the naive learning setting, allowing
us to precisely investigate how signal quality and agent centrality interact. The two notions are
intertwined in the weighted likelihood function, where the formal expression is at equation (1)
in Section 1.1. Informally, the value of this function at θ is the product of the votes of each agent,
where an agent’s vote is how likely the state value θ is after the agent received the signal compared
to before (the signal quality part), and the number of votes is the agent’s eigenvector centrality
(the centrality part).
Our main theorem is that, under some conditions, long-run beliefs are concentrated near the
maximizers of the weighted likelihood function. If we know the probability densities of initial be-
liefs, we can explicitly calculate the consensus belief. This allows us to analyze the interaction; for
example, we can calculate how much more informative a signal has to be to offset the centrality
disadvantage. This formula can have practical applications in the analysis of information spread
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in decentralized networks, such as propagation of rumors or adoption of new technologies. Prac-
titioners interested in empirical results can also use our formula without having to fully grasp the
theory in the paper. Some examples of applications are discussed in Section 7.
Rahimian and Jadbabaie [19] propose essentially the same model in this paper in the case where
the state space is finite, and they have derived the same concentration result as ours in that case.
Our novel contribution is in the analysis of feasibility and convergence of beliefs when the state
space is infinite discrete or continuous. We also draw two policy implications from the model
with Gaussian beliefs: how to seed opinion leaders for technology adoption, and how to solve the
clustered seeding problem introduced by Banerjee et al. [5]. We discuss the relationship between
our work and Rahimian and Jadbabaie [19] in Subsection 1.2.
Finally, we contrast the results of our model with that of Banerjee et al. [5]. Their model tries to
solve the issue of differently informed agents in DeGroot learning by assuming that each agent can
either hold a scalar belief or be uninformed.While their model can capture the spread of awareness
of new things, it does not have the notion of signal informativeness that our model provides.
Our model also gives a different prediction than that of Banerjee et al. [5] on how to seed a
new technology for widespread adoption. Their model has a clustered seeding problem: there is
substantial information loss if the initially informed agents (“seeds”) are clustered in a small group
of communities. This is a problem because a social planner who wants to maximize the impact
of a newly introduced technology should seed it to centrally located opinion leaders, but these
leaders are often closely connected to each other. Our model does not have this problem; the
influence of each agent depends only on the agent’s signal informativeness and centrality. The
key modeling difference is that agents in our model can communicate confidence of their beliefs
that their neighbors can take into account. Therefore, to solve the clustered seeding problem, the
social planner should encourage open and expressive communication between agents.
1.1 Contributions
Our agents are in a social network, represented as a strongly connected directed graph. Assume
that there is a true state of the world θ ∗. Each agent gets a signal drawn from a distribution that
depends on θ ∗. She then forms a belief, the posterior probability distribution of θ ∗ given the signal.
In each round, each agent has access to beliefs of her neighbors and naively assumes that these all
come from independent signals. She then forms the Bayesian posterior of θ ∗ given the signals of
her own and her neighbors as her new belief. This gives rise to an update rule that combines her
belief with her neighbors’ beliefs that she uses in every round.
We prove that our learning process can be viewed as follows. At every time step, each agent
passes copies of signals she has to her neighbors, so copies of signals “flow” through the network.
Every copy is taken as independent and no copy is discarded, so the number of copies of agent j’s
signal that agent i has at round t is the number of paths from j to i of length t . Agent i’s belief at
time t is then the posterior belief conditional on these repeated signals (Prop. 4.7).
We then tackle the important question of what happens to agents’ beliefs in the long run. The
answer depends on the following weighted likelihood function L (Def. 5.1). Let f
(t )
i (θ ) be agent i’s
belief of θ ∗ in round t and f∗(θ ) be the common prior of θ ∗. Then
L(θ ) =
N∏
i=1
(
f
(0)
i (θ )
f∗(θ )
)vi
, (1)
where vi is the eigenvector centrality of agent i . We show that if L(θ1) < L(θ2), then as t →∞,
f
(t )
i (θ1)
f
(t )
i (θ2)
→ 0 (2)
(Prop. 5.5). In other words, agents’ beliefs that the true parameter is θ2 are much stronger than
the corresponding beliefs for θ1 as time goes on. Thus, in the long run, agents’ beliefs should
concentrate at values θ that maximize or nearly maximize L.
The form of the weighted likelihood function highlights two factors that determine the quality
of learning. An agent who is more centrally located (high vi ) and has a more informative signal
(high or low f
(0)
i (θ )/f∗(θ )) has more influence over the consensus belief. Note that our consensus
belief is fundamentally different from that of DeGroot. In ourmodel, the limit belief is the weighted
likelihood maximizer, while in DeGroot, it is a weighted average of beliefs.
The fact that beliefs tend to converge to a point distribution agrees with the following intuition:
agents take a growing number of repeated signals as independent, so they become increasingly
confident in their beliefs. The fact that the limit belief is tractable and interpretable comes as a
surprise, and we believe this to be an attractive feature of our model.
In spite of this intuition and much to our astonishment, the concentration previously discussed
turns out not to hold in general if Θ, the state space, is infinite. We discover that even with a
single θmax uniquely maximizing L, agents’ beliefs may not converge to the point distribution at
θmax (Ex. 6.6). We resolve this difficulty by introducing an extra condition: if θmax still maximizes
a “perturbed” version of L, then the concentration result holds. We can think of this as θmax being
a sufficiently robust maximizer of L. This result requires careful analysis of convergences of infi-
nite sequences, and the generalization of this idea for an arbitrary state space Θ can be found in
Proposition 5.7.
When the state space Θ = R is a continuum, for example in the case of Gaussian beliefs, this
perturbed L condition is still too strong: perturbing L will almost always shift the maximizer due
to the continuity of the space. The correct condition needs to allow the maximizer to shift, but
not too much. Furthermore, it is insufficient to consider the density at a single point, since this
tells us nothing about densities at nearby points and so cannot establish concentration. Instead,
we need to show that for any neighborhood of θmax, agents’ beliefs that the true state lies in that
neighborhood tend to 1. Our Master Theorem 5.10 pulls together all of these ideas.
With the Master Theorem 5.10, we derive a convergence theorem when the state space is a
continuum, provided that the initial beliefs and priors are sufficiently continuous (Def. 6.7). Our
main result in this most difficult case is Theorem 6.9. The following is a simplified version of this
theorem, simplified from Corollary 6.10.
Theorem1.1. Assume that the state spaceΘ = Rk . Suppose that the normalized beliefs f
(0)
i (θ )/f∗(θ )
are bounded continuous functions; the weighted likelihood function L attains the maximum Lmax
uniquely at the pointθmax; and L decays in the sense that there is a bounded set S such that supθ<S L(θ ) <
Lmax. Then, as t → ∞, beliefs f (t )i converge to the point distribution at θmax.
This result states that whenever the initial beliefs are continuous functions that are bounded
with respect to the prior and they decay sufficiently fast, agents’ beliefs converge to the maximizer
of the weighted likelihood function if this maximizer is unique. This result encompasses a wide
range of probability distributions in practice. For example, the theorem applies when beliefs are
multivariate Gaussian. Therefore, Theorem 1.1 is widely applicable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss related literature in the remaining of
this section. Section 2 describes ourmodel. Section 3 discusses mathematical preliminaries. Section
4 gives fundamental definitions, interprets the updated beliefs, and analyzes feasibility of initial
conditions. Section 5 proves the “Master Theorem” that establishes concentration of beliefs near
the weighted likelihood maximizers. Section 6 uses the Master Theorem to prove convergence
of beliefs in the finite, infinite discrete, and Rk cases. Section 7 gives applications in the cases of
binary, Poisson, and Gaussian beliefs.
1.2 Related Literature
Our paper is closely related to a growing literature on learning and belief formation in social
networks [3, 4, 6, 11, 22, 23]. Much of this literature focuses on Bayesian learning [1, 7, 15, 18] and
DeGroot learning [8, 12]. Comparable to Golub and Jackson [12], our model shows that centrally
located agents, as measured by eigenvector centralities, have more influence on the consensus
belief. However, in ourmodel, eigenvector centralities appear as duplicate agents rather than linear
weights in the limit belief.
Specifically, our paper belongs to the quasi-Bayesian learning literature. Eyster and Rabin [9, 10]
and Rahimian et al. [20] study long-run aggregation of information when agents ignore repetition.
Li and Tan [14] study learning where each agent updates both her belief on the state of the world
and her belief on her neighbors’ beliefs. Jadbabaie et al. [13] also combine DeGroot learning with
Bayesian updates. Features that distinguish their model from ours are learning objectives and
arrivals of information. Agents in our model receive signals only once at the beginning, rather
than at every time step, and Bayesian-update based on their neighbors’ beliefs rather than taking
weighted averages of distributions. Agents in our model can form and update beliefs even if the
true state of the world does not exist, and our limit beliefs are biased by influential agents which
do not exist in their model. Lastly, likelihood ratios play a central role in our model; they appear
in Rahimian et al. [21] and Molavi et al. [17] in a different context.
Rahimian and Jadbabaie [19] propose a model where agents use Bayes’ rule to come up with
a belief update rule that is optimal for the first round and naively continue to use the same rule
for subsequent rounds. This naive agent behavior is the same as ours, and resembles the micro-
foundation of the DeGroot update rule proposed in DeMarzo et al. [8]. Agents in their model have
utilities; they take actions to maximize their utilities and only observe their neighbors’ actions. In
contrast, agents in our models do not have utilities, do not take actions, and have direct access to
their neighbors’ beliefs. When the state space is finite, the action space is a probability simplex
over the state space, and each agent’s utility is the negative Euclidean distance between her action
and the point mass at the true state, each agent’s action corresponds to her belief. Under these
assumptions, their model becomes equivalent to ours when the state space is finite, and they in-
dependently derive what we call the naive Bayesian update rule (Def 2.1) in their Section 4. They
also independently prove the concentration result in this special case when the state space is finite
(Thm. 6.3) in their Theorem 4.
Finally, our work is related to Banerjee et al. [5]. In their model, the informedness of agents is a
binary state, informed individuals hold scalar beliefs, and the learning rule is to take the average
belief of informed neighbors. This contrasts with our model where informedness is a continuous
attribute. Their work identifies the clustered seeding problem discussed in the introduction, which
does not occur in our model. See further discussion of this problem in Section 7.3.
2 MODEL
We discuss the assumptions of our model in this section.
2.1 Social Network
Our agents are in a social network, modeled as a directed graph G with N ≥ 2 nodes, labeled
1, 2, . . . ,N corresponding to N agents. An edge from i to j is denoted (i, j) and means that there is
information flow from agent i to agent j . Assume that G is strongly connected, that is, for every
i and j there is a path from i to j . Suppose that there is a self-loop (i, i) at every node, meaning
that information flows from every agent to herself. If there is an edge (i, j), we say that i is an
in-neighbor of j . Let N (i) denote the set of in-neighbors of i .
2.2 Beliefs
Let Θ be the space of parameters θ , modeled as a measure space. We model beliefs as probability
density functions on Θ: nonnegative measurable functions f : Θ → R≥0 such that the integral∫
θ ∈Θ f (θ ) = 1. These reduce to probability mass functions in a discrete setting, i.e. when Θ is
discrete with the counting measure. Note that we model beliefs as probability densities, which is
a special case of general probability distributions. For example, a point distribution on R cannot
be represented as a density, but most probability distributions in practice are densities. A prior
on Θ is any nonnegative measurable function f : Θ → R≥0. If the integral
∫
θ ∈Θ f (θ ) diverges,
we call the prior f improper. Note that our improper priors are not necessarily limits of proper
priors, but simply densities whose integrals diverge and so cannot be normalized. An example of
an improper prior is the uninformative prior, f (θ ) ≡ 1, where Θ is an infinite discrete set or an
unbounded interval of R.
Suppose that each agent has a common (possibly improper) prior f∗ for the true state of the
world θ ∗ on Θ. Assume that f∗(θ ) > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ. This assumption is important in order to state
the update rule for beliefs (e.g. in Definition 2.1).
2.3 Belief Updates
Agents update their beliefs based on the beliefs of their in-neighbors using the following rule,
which will be justified shortly.
Definition 2.1. The naive Bayesian updated belief for agent i with respect to beliefs f1, . . . , fN is
the belief
f (θ ) = f∗(θ )
∏
j∈N (i )
(
fj (θ )/f∗(θ )
)∫
θ ′∈Θ f∗(θ ′)
∏
j∈N (i )
(
fj (θ ′)/f∗(θ ′)
) ,
which is well-defined whenever the integral in the denominator is nonzero and finite.
It is easily checked that this definition defines a belief. We now provide a justification for this
definition. In the justification, we will assume that f∗ is a probability density function, but the
formula in Definition 2.1 also makes sense for improper priors.
Consider the following scenario called an underlying scenario. Suppose that agent i knows a
family of probability density functions (pθ ,i )θ ∈Θ, indexed by the parameter θ and the agent i , over
a common sample space Ωi . We make the following marginalizability assumption, which is impor-
tant in order to reason consistently about marginal densities. For any integers n1, . . . ,nN ≥ 0, let
Xi,1, . . . ,Xi,ni be random variables drawn independently from pθ ,i . We thus have a joint probabil-
ity density for these random variables
p
((Xi, j)1≤i≤n,1≤j≤ni , θ ) = p(θ ) N∏
i=1
ni∏
j=1
p(Xi, j |θ ).
Assume that this distribution can be marginalized over θ with positive density, that is
p
((Xi, j)1≤i≤n,1≤j≤ni ) = ∫
θ ∈Θ
p(θ )
N∏
i=1
ni∏
j=1
p(Xi, j |θ )
is nonzero and finite.
Agent i receives a signal Xi drawn from pθ ∗,i , the distribution corresponding to the true pa-
rameter θ ∗, without knowing θ ∗. She then forms a belief fi (θ ) for θ ∗ conditional on the signal Xi .
Suppose that agent i learns about beliefs fj (θ ) of all her in-neighbors j ∈ N (i), formed in the same
way, and wishes to perform a Bayesian update on her own belief. The result will be the belief f (θ )
for θ ∗ conditional on signals X j for every j ∈ N (i). Even though the resulting density seems to
depend on X j , we will show in the next proposition that this update can be performed knowing
only the beliefs fj but not the private signals X j , with the formula as in Definition 2.1.
Proposition 2.2. In an underlying scenario described above, the updated belief for agent i is the
naive Bayesian updated belief with respect to beliefs f1, . . . , fN as in Definition 2.1.
Proof. By definition, the updated belief is
f (θ ) = p (θ |(X j )j∈N (i )) = p(θ )p ((X j )j∈N (i ) |θ )∫
θ ′∈Θ p(θ ′)p
((X j )j∈N (i ) |θ ′) = p(θ )
∏
j∈N (i ) p
(
X j |θ
)∫
θ ′∈Θ p(θ ′)
∏
j∈N (i ) p
(
X j |θ ′
) ,
where the second equality is Bayes’ rule and the last equality holds because X j ’s are conditionally
independent given any θ . Note that the integral in the denominator is nonzero and finite due to
the marginalizability assumption. Because p(θ ) = f∗(θ ) and
p(X j |θ ) =
p(θ |X j)
p(θ ) p(X j) =
fj (θ )
f∗(θ )
p(X j ),
substituting these into our first equation gives the desired formula. 
2.4 Belief Dynamics
Here we describe the evolution of beliefs. Agents share a common prior f∗ of θ ∗, which may be
improper, and agent i starts off with initial belief f
(0)
i of θ
∗. The functions f∗, f
(0)
1 , . . . , f
(0)
N
are the
initial condition of the model. The subtlety is that not all initial conditions lead to well-defined
updates. Nevertheless, in Section 4.3, we will provide simple checks that guarantee the existence
of updated beliefs. For t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , let f
(t )
i be agent i’s belief of θ
∗ at round t . Agents update
beliefs as follows. For t ≥ 0, f (t+1)i is the naive Bayesian updated belief (Def. 2.1) for agent i with
respect to beliefs f
(t )
1 , . . . , f
(t )
N .
We call an initial condition feasible if the updated beliefs are well-defined in every round, that
is, the integral in Definition 2.1 is nonzero and finite. Moreover, an initial condition has an under-
lying scenario if it arises from an underlying scenario in the above justification of Definition 2.1.
Proposition 4.7 shows that an initial condition with an underlying scenario is always feasible.
For an initial condition with an underlying scenario, note that although the update rule is ratio-
nally justified, it is only optimal for the first round. In later rounds, an optimal update needs to take
into account that the agents’ beliefs are already updated at least once and so no longer independent.
Still, our naive agents use the same update rule for every round. This modeling choice formalizes
what we said earlier that people use Bayes’ rule to learn, but they ignore repeated information.
It may seem that using Bayes’ rule on the entire distribution requires agents to communicate
an infinite amount of information. Nevertheless, if conjugate priors are used (say, Gaussian beliefs
and Gaussian signals, or Beta beliefs and Binomial signals), then agents only need to keep track of
a finite number of distribution parameters. Moreover, our model is robust under discretization in
the following sense. Suppose that agents can only learn about other agents’ beliefs at a fixed finite
set of points. By Proposition 5.4, the ratio of beliefs f
(t )
i (θ1)/f (t )i (θ2) is completely determined by
the initial ratios f
(0)
j (θ1)/f (0)j (θ2) for 1 ≤ j ≤ N , so the ratios of beliefs at these fixed points are
preserved and hence so are the approximate shapes of beliefs. These ratios also dictate convergence
of beliefs towards the maximizer of the weighted likelihood function (Sec. 5). Therefore, assuming
that we choose points close to themaximizer and beliefs are sufficiently continuous, the discretized
beliefs will converge to the approximate maximizer.
We name our model naive Bayesian for two reasons. First, our model combines features from
naive learning and Bayesian learning. Second, our agents assume that distributions of neighbors
are independent conditional on the state, which is also the assumption made in Naive Bayes clas-
sifiers in machine learning.
3 MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES
To analyze our model, we require the following mathematics. We review Perron-Frobenius theory,
which helps us determine the behavior of large powers of matrices and establish convergence of
beliefs, and the theory of Lp spaces, which helps us bound functions and establish feasibility of
initial conditions.
3.1 Perron-Frobenius Theory
LetG be the graph of our model, and let A be the adjacency matrix ofG:Ai j = 1 if there is an edge
(i, j) and 0 otherwise. The Perron-Frobenius theory provides us with properties of eigenvalues and
eigenvectors of A.
Definition 3.1. A square matrix M is primitive if its entries are nonnegative and the entries of
Mk are positive for some k > 0.
For an adjacency matrix, a power of the matrix counts the number of paths between each pair
of nodes. Hence we would expect that for a strongly connected social network with self-loops, the
corresponding adjacency matrix should be primitive. This is formalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. A is a primitive matrix.
Proof. By strong connectedness, for every i and j , there is a path Pi j from i to j . Let k be the
maximum length of all Pi j ’s. We can extend a path to arbitrary lengths by using self-loops, so there
is a path from any i to any j of length k . Because the (i, j) entry of Ak is the number of paths from
i to j of length k (see e.g. Lemma 4.3), Ak has positive entries. Therefore A is primitive. 
The following theorem from Meyer [16, Chapter 8], a version of Perron-Frobenius for primitive
matrices, characterizes the largest eigenvalue of a primitive matrix and the growth rate of the
matrix’s powers.
Theorem 3.3 (Perron-Frobenius for Primitive Matrices). Let M be a primitive matrix. Let
r = ρ(M) be the spectral radius ofM , that is, the maximum absolute value of eigenvalues ofM . Then
r is an eigenvalue ofM , any other eigenvalue ofM has absolute value less than r , and there are unique
vectors v and w with positive entries such that
Mv = rv, wM = rw, ‖v ‖1 = ‖w ‖1 = 1.
Note that ‖·‖1 denotes the sum of entries. Call v the Perron vector of M . Thenw is the Perron vector
of M⊤.
Finally, the limit limk→∞Mk/rk exists and is given by
P := lim
k→∞
Mk
rk
=
vw⊤
w⊤v
.
This limit P is called the Perron projection of M .
The following lemma will be useful when we reason that the entries of Ak tend to infinity.
Lemma 3.4. The spectral radius of A is greater than 1, that is, ρ(A) > 1.
Proof. Let r = ρ(A). Lemma 3.2 implies thatA is primitive, so by Theorem 3.3, r is an eigenvalue
of A, and there is an eigenvector v associated with r with positive entries. Pick an arbitrary edge
(i, j) with i , j . Then
rvi = Avi =
N∑
i ′=1
Aii ′vi ′ ≥ vi +vj > vi ,
implying that r > 1. 
We now define the notion of centrality alluded to in the introduction.
Definition 3.5. If v is the Perron vector of A, then call vi the eigenvector centrality of agent i .
Eigenvector centrality is a standard notion that measures the influences of agents. To justify
this, note that by definition,
rvi =
N∑
j=1
Ai jvj =
∑
i ∈N (j)
vj .
Call vi the score of agent i . Then this equation says that one’s score is large if one’s information
can reach many agents; moreover, reaching agents with a larger score contributes more to one’s
score. This exact behavior characterizes influence: one’s influence is large if one talks to many
people, and talking to more influential people contributes more to one’s influence than talking
to less influential people. So it is appropriate to say that eigenvector centrality is a measure of
influence.
3.2 Lp Spaces
Let f : Θ → R≥0 be a nonnegative measurable function. For any p ∈ [1,∞), recall that f ∈ Lp
means that the pth power of f has finite integral,
∫
θ ∈Θ f
p
< ∞. Moreover, f ∈ L∞ means that f
is bounded almost everywhere, ess supθ ∈Θ f < ∞. The following inequality, Hölder’s inequality,
is fundamental in the study of Lp spaces. Note that the version presented here has a different
parametrization of exponents from the usual formulation.
Theorem 3.6 (Hölder’s Ineqality). Let f1, . . . , fN : Θ → R≥0 be measurable functions. Let
pi ∈ [0, 1] be such that p1 + · · · + pN = 1. Then∫
θ ∈Θ
f
p1
1 . . . f
pN
N
≤
(∫
θ ∈Θ
f1
)p1
. . .
(∫
θ ∈Θ
fN
)pN
.
In particular, if fi ∈ L1 for all i , then the weighted geometric mean f p11 . . . f
pN
N
∈ L1.
We also consider the following “weighted” Lp spaces, where the weight is the common prior,
which will be useful in the study of initial conditions in Section 4.3.
Definition 3.7. For p ∈ [1,∞], define the Lp space weighted by the prior, Lp∗ , as follows. If p ∈
[1,∞), the space consists of measurable functions f : Θ → R≥0 such that
∫
θ ∈Θ f∗ f
p
< ∞. Equip
these functions with the norm
‖ f ‖p,∗ :=
(∫
θ ∈Θ
f∗ f p
)1/p
.
This is just like the Lp norm but weighted by the prior. The space L∞∗ is the same as L∞ and consists
of measurable functions f : Θ → R≥0 such that ess supθ ∈Θ f < ∞. Equip these functions with the
norm
‖ f ‖∞,∗ = ess sup
θ ∈Θ
f .
This is exactly the same as the L∞ norm.
We now present a version of Hölder’s inequality on these weighted Lp spaces, as well as an
interpolation result.
Lemma 3.8. Let p ∈ [1,∞) and let f1, . . . , fN ∈ Lp∗ . Let pi ∈ [0, 1] be such that p1 + · · · + pN = 1.
Then f
p1
1 . . . f
pN
N ∈ L
p
∗ , with f p11 . . . f pNN p,∗ ≤ ‖ f1‖p1p,∗ . . . ‖ fN ‖pNp,∗ .
Proof. Apply Hölder’s inequality (Theorem 3.6) to the functions f∗ f
p
i . 
Lemma 3.9. If 1 ≤ p < q < r ≤ ∞, then Lp∗ ∩ Lr∗ ⊆ Lq∗ .
Proof. First assume that r < ∞. Then there are p1,p2 ∈ (0, 1) such that p1 + p2 = 1 and
p1p + p2r = q. If f ∈ Lp∗ ∩ Lr∗, then f p , f r ∈ L1∗. By Lemma 3.8, f p1p+p2r = f q ∈ L1∗, so that f ∈ Lq∗ .
We directly prove the case where r = ∞. LetM = ‖ f ‖∞,∗. Then f ≤ M almost everywhere, so∫
θ ∈Θ
f∗ f q ≤ Mq−p
∫
θ ∈Θ
f∗ f p < ∞.
Therefore f ∈ Lq∗ . 
4 UNDERSTANDING THE MODEL
In Section 4.1, we introduce some preliminary definitions that will be useful in understanding the
model in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. Then we interpret the updated beliefs in Section 4.2. Finally, we find
the conditions that guarantee that an initial condition is feasible in Section 4.3.
4.1 Preliminary Definitions
We introduce the notion of normalized beliefs.
Definition 4.1. The normalized belief of agent i at round t is the function
д
(t )
i (θ ) :=
f
(t )
i (θ )
f∗(θ )
.
We can interpret this as how large a a belief is compared to the prior. This quantity will appear
in the weighted likelihood function in Definition 5.1 and play a central role in our analysis. Note
that the normalized belief is well-defined because f∗(θ ) > 0 by assumption, and it has the property
that it is in L1∗ with norm 1:
д(t )i 1,∗ = 1. However, it need not be a belief, as the integral ∫θ ∈Θ д(t )i (θ )
may diverge.
With normalized beliefs, the update rule in Definition 2.1 assumes the simpler form
д
(t+1)
i (θ ) =
∏
j∈N (i ) д
(t )
j (θ )∫
θ ′∈Θ f∗(θ ′)
∏
j∈N (i ) д
(t )
j (θ ′)
. (3)
We now introduce the notation for the number of paths between each pair of nodes.
Definition 4.2. For nodes i and j of G and t ≥ 0, let P (t )i j be the number of paths from i to j of
length t . By convention, there is one path of length 0 from a node to itself and no path of length 0
from a node to a different node.
The following simple combinatorial lemma characterizes the number of paths. It is completely
standard but we include it here for completeness.
Lemma 4.3. The numbers of paths satisfy the recurrence P
(t+1)
i j =
∑
k ∈N (j) P
(t )
ik
. Moreover, P
(t )
i j is
the (i, j) entry of the matrix At .
Proof. The recurrence follows by considering that a path from i to j of length t + 1 can be
broken down into paths from i to k of length t and from k to j of length 1 for some k . Let P (t ) be
the matrix whose (i, j) entry is P (t )i j . The recurrence can be written in the form P (t+1) = P (t )A, with
the initial condition P (0) = I . It follows by induction that P (t ) = At . 
Finally, we formally define the notion of k-feasibility and feasibility.
Definition 4.4. For any k ≥ 1, an initial condition f∗, f1, . . . , fN is k-feasible if the updated beliefs
are well-defined up to at least round k . An initial condition is feasible if it is k-feasible for every k .
4.2 Interpretation of Updated Beliefs
We interpret what agents are doing in our model. Our goal is to show that each agent aggregates
information where another agent’s initial belief is weighted by the number of paths from that
agent to the aggregating agent. This means that an agent who has many paths to other agents, i.e.
an agent with high centrality, will be influential in our model. This result will lead to conditions
for feasible initial conditions in Section 4.3 and show concentration of beliefs in Section 5.
To carry out this program, we first give an explicit condition for k-feasibility and an explicit
formula for the updated beliefs in the next proposition.
Proposition 4.5. An initial condition f∗, f
(0)
1 , . . . , f
(0)
N
is k-feasible if and only if for all i and
0 ≤ t ≤ k , the function
(д(0)1 )P
(t )
1i . . . (д(0)N )P
(t )
Ni ∈ L1∗
with nonzero norm. In that case, for all 0 ≤ t ≤ k ,
д
(t )
i (θ ) =
∏N
j=1 д
(0)
j (θ )P
(t )
j i∫
θ ′∈Θ f∗(θ ′)
∏N
j=1 д
(0)
j (θ ′)P
(t )
j i
.
Proof. The proof is essentially by induction on k . Any initial condition is certainly 0-feasible.
And for any i ,
∏N
j=1(д(0)j )P
(0)
j i = д
(0)
i ∈ L1∗ with norm 1. This proves the base case k = 0.
Assume that the proposition holds for k . For a (k + 1)-feasible initial condition, the updated
beliefs given by equation (3)
д
(k+1)
i (θ ) =
∏
j∈N (i ) д
(k)
j (θ )∫
θ ′∈Θ f∗(θ ′)
∏
j∈N (i ) д
(k)
j (θ ′)
are well-defined. By the induction hypothesis, this equals
д
(k+1)
i (θ ) =
∏
j∈N (i )
∏N
ℓ=1 д
(0)
ℓ
(θ )P
(k )
ℓj∫
θ ′∈Θ f∗(θ ′)
∏
j∈N (i )
∏N
ℓ=1 д
(0)
ℓ
(θ ′)P
(k )
ℓj
=
∏N
ℓ=1 д
(0)
ℓ
(θ )P (k+1)ℓi∫
θ ′∈Θ f∗(θ ′)
∏N
ℓ=1 д
(0)
ℓ
(θ ′)P (k+1)ℓi
, (4)
where the second equality holds because the exponent ofд
(0)
ℓ
is
∑
j∈N (i ) P
(k)
ℓj
= P
(k+1)
ℓi
by Lemma 4.3.
So the formula holds. Finally, the denominator of the right-hand expression shows that
∏N
j=1(д(0)j )P
(k+1)
j i ∈
L1∗ with nonzero norm.
Conversely, suppose that
∏N
j=1(д(0)j )P
(t )
j i ∈ L1∗with nonzero norm for all t ≤ k+1. By the induction
hypothesis, the initial condition is k-feasible, and we must show that it is (k + 1)-feasible. The
right-hand expression of equation (4) is well-defined, so by running the same argument as above
backwards, it can be written as the expression for д
(k+1)
i (θ ) in the update rule. Therefore д(k+1)i is
well-defined and the initial condition is (k + 1)-feasible. 
We can now prove that an initial condition with an underlying scenario (see Section 2.3) is
feasible, as a result of the next proposition.
Proposition 4.6. Assume that the initial condition f∗, f
(0)
1 , . . . , f
(0)
N has an underlying scenario.
For any integers n1, . . . ,nN ≥ 0, the function
(д(0)1 )n1 . . . (д(0)N )nN ∈ L1∗
with nonzero norm.
Proof. Recall that agent i’s initial belief is f
(0)
i (θ ) = p(θ |Xi ), where Xi is her signal. Denote by
(Xnii )Ni=1 the ordered tuple of ni independent copies of Xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . By the marginalizability
assumption, the joint density of this tuple is
p
((Xnii )Ni=1) = ∫
θ ∈Θ
f∗(θ )p
((Xnii )Ni=1 |θ ) = ∫
θ ∈Θ
f∗(θ )
N∏
i=1
p (Xi |θ )ni
=
∫
θ ∈Θ
f∗(θ )
N∏
i=1
(
f
(0)
i (θ )p(Xi)
f∗(θ )
)ni
=
( N∏
i=1
p(Xi )ni
) ∫
θ ∈Θ
f∗
N∏
i=1
(д(0)i )ni ,
and it is nonzero and finite. So
∏N
i=1(д(0)i )ni ∈ L1∗ with nonzero norm. 
As a corollary of the previous two propositions, we will show that an initial condition with an
underlying scenario is feasible, as well as give an explicit formula for the updated beliefs. This is
important as it gives us insight into the update process.
Proposition 4.7. An initial condition f∗, f
(0)
1 , . . . , f
(0)
N
with an underlying scenario is feasible. If
agent i receives signal Xi in the underlying scenario and I
(t )
i is the ordered tuple consisting of P
(t )
ji
independent copies of X j for each j , then
f
(t )
i (θ ) = p
(
θ |I (t )i
)
.
In other words, the belief of agent i in round t for each parameter θ is the belief for that parameter
conditional on the information I
(t )
i .
Proof. Propositions 4.5 and 4.6 directly imply the first statement. For the second statement, as
in Proposition 2.2, we can compute
p
(
θ |I (t )i
)
= p
(
θ
(X P (t )j ij )N
j=1
)
=
f∗(θ )
∏N
j=1 д
(0)
j (θ )P
(t )
j i∫
θ ′∈Θ f∗(θ ′)
∏N
j=1 д
(0)
j (θ ′)P
(t )
j i
.
By Proposition 4.5, this quantity equals f
(t )
i (θ ). 
Proposition 4.7 gives us an intuition of the process. At every time step, each agent passes copies
of signals she has to her neighbors, so copies of signals “flow” through the network. Every copy
is taken as independent and no copy is discarded, so the number of copies of agent j’s signal that
agent i has at round t is the number of paths from j to i of length t . Moreover, we can interpret
the normalized belief д
(t )
i (θ ) as the amount of support that I (t )i provides for θ . Since д(t )i (θ ) =
p(θ |I (t )i )/p(θ ) by Proposition 4.7, this quantity is larger or smaller than 1 if learning I (t )i increases
or decreases the probability density at θ , respectively.
From Proposition 4.7, we can qualitatively predict how our model behaves in the long term. Be-
cause repeated signals in I
(t )
i are taken as independent, agents should become overconfident over
time. Furthermore, because the numbers of repeated signals are the numbers of paths, agents with
more paths to other agents (those with higher eigenvector centralities) should be more influen-
tial. Our results on concentration and convergence of beliefs in Sections 5 and 6 confirm these
predictions.
4.3 Initial Conditions
We now build on the work of the previous section to investigate containment relationships be-
tween classes of initial conditions and present simple sufficient conditions for feasibility.
Definition 4.8. An initial condition f∗, f1, . . . , fN is proper if
∫
θ ∈Θ f∗ < ∞. It is improper if∫
θ ∈Θ f∗ = ∞. Let P and IP denote classes of proper and improper initial conditions.
Let F and Fk denote classes of feasible and k-feasible initial conditions. LetU denote the class
of initial conditions with underlying scenarios.
The notion of properness may be of interest because it tells us whether the prior can be realized
as a probability density. On the one hand, a priorwhich is a probability density seems to correspond
to real-world situations, but on the other hand, the “uninformative prior” f∗ ≡ 1 is a natural choice
in many situations but is often improper. Note that an initial condition with an underlying scenario
is proper by definition, i.e.U ⊆ P .
It is obvious that Fk+1 ⊆ Fk , F ⊆ Fk andU ⊆ P . Proposition 4.7 shows the nontrivial contain-
mentU ⊆ F . Thus, the classes are contained in one another as shown in the diagram in Figure 1.
We now show that there isΘ andG such that all regions in the diagram are nonempty. In particular,
these containments are strict, and so the classes do not collapse into one another. For example, it
is not sufficient to show that an initial condition is feasible by checking 1-feasibility.
Proposition 4.9. Let Θ = {1, 2, 3, . . . } and G be the graph with 2 nodes and all 4 possible edges.
Then all regions in the diagram in Figure 1 are nonempty for all values of k .
Proof. An underlying scenario clearly exists (e.g. take f∗(θ ) = cθ−2 for an appropriate c and
let agents always receive a constant signal 0: Ωi = {0} and pθ ,i (0) = 1), so U , ∅. Examples of
initial conditions in other regions are given in the following table, where c, c1, c2 are normalizing
constants.
P IP
U F Fk+1
Fk
Fig. 1. Containment relationships between classes of initial conditions, where in the figure k can be any pos-
itive integer. There is a parameter space Θ and a graphG such that all regions in the diagram are nonempty
for all values of k (Prop. 4.9).
Region f∗(θ ) f (0)1 (θ ) f (0)2 (θ )
P \ F1 θ−3 cθ−2 cθ−2
IP \ F1 θ−3 for odd θ , 1 for even θ cθ−2 cθ−2
(Fk ∩ P) \ (Fk+1 ∩ P) θ−(2k+1+1) cθ−2k+1 cθ−2k+1
(Fk ∩ IP) \ (Fk+1 ∩ IP) θ−(2k+1+1) for odd θ , 1 for even θ cθ−2k+1 cθ−2k+1
(F ∩ P) \ U θ−3 c1θ−2 c2θ−4
F ∩ IP 1 cθ−2 cθ−2
The following considerations will help verify the table. An initial condition is in P if
∫
θ
f∗ < ∞
and is in IP otherwise. For any t ≥ 1, there are 2t−1 paths from any node i to any node j . By
Proposition 4.5, an initial condition is in Fk if and only if∫
θ
f∗(д(0)1 )2
t−1(д(0)2 )2
t−1
is nonzero and finite for all 1 ≤ t ≤ k , and it is in F if and only if this is true for all t ≥ 1. These
checks are straightforward using the fact that
∑∞
θ=1 θ
−p is finite for p > 1 and infinite for p ≤ 1.
To check that the example for (F ∩ P) \U does not have an underlying scenario, use Proposition
4.6 and the fact that ∫
θ
f∗(д(0)1 )2 = c21
∫
θ
θ−1 = ∞.

Now we develop a sufficient condition for feasibility and show that it is “individually optimal,”
in the sense that will be explained in Proposition 4.13. We first take care of the degeneracy issue.
Definition 4.10. An initial condition f∗, f
(0)
1 , . . . , f
(0)
N
is nondegenerate if the set {θ ∈ Θ : f (0)i (θ ) >
0 for all i} does not have measure zero. It is degenerate otherwise.
Alternatively, an initial condition is degenerate if the product of initial beliefs vanishes almost
everywhere. We might expect that degeneracy is a problem for performing updates as the denom-
inator in Definition 2.1 might be zero. The following proposition makes this rigorous.
Proposition 4.11. A feasible initial condition is nondegenerate.
Proof. Pick any node i and pick k such that there is a path from any j to i of length k . Let
nj = P
(k)
ji > 0. Then Proposition 4.5 implies that (д(0)1 )n1 . . . (д(0)N )nN ∈ L1∗ with nonzero norm. If the
initial condition is degenerate, then this function vanishes almost everywhere and must have zero
norm, contradiction. Therefore the initial condition is nondegenerate. 
Conversely, by assuming nondegeneracy, we can prove feasibility by requiring some form of
boundedness. Specifically, it suffices for the normalized beliefs to be in L
p
∗ for p large; this is stated
precisely below.
Proposition 4.12. A nondegenerate initial condition f∗, f
(0)
1 , . . . , f
(0)
N
is feasible if for every i and
M < ∞, there isM ≤ p ≤ ∞ such that д(0)i ∈ L
p
∗ .
Proof. By Proposition 4.5, it suffices to prove that for any n1, . . . ,nN ≥ 0 that do not vanish
simultaneously,
∏N
i=1(д(0)i )ni ∈ L1∗ with nonzero norm. The “nonzero norm” part follows from
nondegeneracy: {θ ∈ Θ : д(0)i (θ ) > 0 for all i} does not have measure zero. To prove that it is in L1∗,
we proceed byway of interpolation (Lemma 3.9) andHölder (Lemma 3.8). LetM = n1+· · ·+nN ≥ 1.
By hypothesis, for each i , there is M ≤ p ≤ ∞ such that д(0)i ∈ L
p
∗ . Because д
(0)
i ∈ L1∗ by definition,
by Lemma 3.9, д
(0)
i ∈ LM∗ . Then by Lemma 3.8,
∏N
i=1(д(0)i )ni/M ∈ LM∗ . Hence
∏N
i=1(д(0)i )ni ∈ L1∗. 
One might ask whether the requirement in the previous proposition can be further weakened.
Unfortunately, the following proposition shows that the hypothesis д
(0)
i ∈ L
p
∗ in Proposition 4.12
is already the optimal one to put on each д
(0)
i individually.
Proposition 4.13. Fix f∗. Let S ⊆ L1∗ be a set with the following property: any nondegenerate initial
condition f∗, f
(0)
1 , . . . , f
(0)
N
such that д
(0)
i ∈ S for all i is feasible. Then S ⊆ L
p
∗ for all 1 ≤ p < ∞.
Proof. Pick any f ∈ S and 1 ≤ p < ∞. We must show that f ∈ Lp∗ . If f vanishes almost
everywhere, then clearly f ∈ Lp∗ . So suppose otherwise. An initial condition with д(0)i = f is
well-defined (i.e. f
(0)
i has integral 1) because f ∈ L1∗, and it is nondegenerate, so it is feasible by
hypothesis. We show that this feasibility forces f to be in L
p
∗ . By Proposition 4.5, the function
f P
(t )
1i +· · ·+P
(t )
Ni ∈ L1∗ for any i and t . By Lemma 4.3, these P (t )ji ’s are entries of At , which go to infinity
as t → ∞ by Theorem 3.3 and Lemma 3.4. So we obtain a sequence pt → ∞ as t → ∞ such that
f ∈ Lpt∗ . By Lemma 3.9, we can interpolate to get f ∈ Lp∗ . 
Finally, Proposition 4.12 can be slightly weakened to give a sufficient condition for feasibility
that is easy to check in practice in the next corollary. This weaker version is used to establish
feasibility in e.g. Corollary 6.10 and Theorem 1.1.
Corollary 4.14. A nondegenerate initial condition f∗, f
(0)
1 , . . . , f
(0)
N is feasible if for every i , д
(0)
i ∈
L∞, that is, д(0)i is bounded almost everywhere.
Proof. By definition, д
(0)
i ∈ L1∗, so by Lemma 3.9, д(0)i ∈ L
p
∗ for any 1 ≤ p < ∞. Thus the
requirements of Proposition 4.12 are satisfied. 
5 CONCENTRATION OF BELIEFS
With the tools we have built up, we can now start seriously analyzing the model. Assume from
this point onwards that the initial condition is feasible. Our goal in this section is to establish the
following remarkable result about concentration of beliefs. In the long term, beliefs of agents in
our model tend to concentrate at points of Θ which maximize the weighted likelihood function L
(Def. 5.1). Specifically, for a set A ⊆ Θ such that the values of L on this set are dominated in some
sense by L(θ ′) for another θ ′ ∈ Θ, ∫
θ ∈A
f
(t )
i (θ ) → 0
as t → ∞. We can think of this as saying that the agents’ beliefs are being concentrated more
and more near the maximizer of L, and so the beliefs on any set that stays clear of the maximizer
tend to zero. The precise statement is in the Master Theorem 5.10. Once we have this result, it
will become relatively easy to show convergence of the agents’ beliefs towards maximizers of L in
various settings; this will be done in Section 6.
5.1 Weighted Likelihood
We first define the weighted likelihood function mentioned in the introduction.
Definition 5.1. Assume that the initial condition is feasible. The weighted likelihood function is
defined for each θ ∈ Θ by
L(θ ) =
N∏
i=1
(д(0)i (θ ))vi .
Recall that д
(0)
i is the normalized beliefs defined in Definition 4.1 and that the eigenvector cen-
trality vi can be thought of as the influence of agent i (Sec. 3.1). So this function aggregates the
normalized beliefs of agents while being biased by the agents’ influences. To see how this function
is being “biased,” the unbiased likelihood of each parameter θ given the initial beliefs of agents
formed according to an underlying scenario (Sec. 2.3) is given by
Lunbiased(θ ) = c f∗(θ )
N∏
i=1
д
(0)
i (θ ),
where c is a normalizing constant. Under optimal information aggregation, the posterior belief
is proportional to Lunbiased. To derive this, simply do the computation analogous to the one in
Proposition 2.2. Notice that L and Lunbiased are different in two ways. First, each д
(0)
i factor in L is
to the power of vi , suggesting that L is biased by the centrality of each agent as already pointed
out. Second, there is an extra factor of f∗, the prior, in Lunbiased. This is because agents in our model
become so confident in their opinions that the prior is disregarded entirely, so this factor does not
appear in L.
We may wonder what properties the weighted likelihood function L has. The following curious
proposition gives a partial answer: L is almost bounded, that is, almost in L∞. This result is not
used anywhere.
Proposition 5.2. For any 1 ≤ p < ∞, L ∈ Lp∗ with nonzero norm.
Proof. By Proposition 4.5,
∏N
j=1(д(0)j )P
(t )
j i ∈ L1∗ for any i and t . The idea is that we can average
these functions together to get the desired result. Recall that
∑
i vi = 1. By Lemma 3.8, we can take
the weighted geometric mean for all i weighted by vi to get
N∏
j=1
(д(0)j )
∑N
i=1 vi P
(t )
j i ∈ L1∗.
By Lemma 4.3, P
(t )
ji is the (j, i) entry of At , so the quantity in the exponent is the jth entry of Atv .
Because Av = rv where r = ρ(A), this quantity is r tvj . We conclude that L ∈ Lr t∗ for all t ≥ 0.
Because r > 1 by Lemma 3.4, Lemma 3.9 implies that L ∈ Lp∗ for all 1 ≤ p < ∞. Its norms are
nonzero because the initial condition is nondegenerate (Prop. 4.11). 
We now show that the weighted likelihood function guides the convergence of the ratio of
beliefs at two different points (Prop. 5.5). We can think of this as a “pointwise” concentration
result. It is much weaker than the actual concentration result we seek (except when Θ is finite; see
Theorem 6.3). Nonetheless, it is the basis of the proof of the Master Theorem 5.10. The next lemma
deals with the degeneracy of the weighted likelihood function, i.e. the characterization of when
L(θ ) = 0. It is used to avoid some issues of dividing by zero.
Lemma 5.3. There isT with the following property. For any θ ∈ Θ and i , if L(θ ) = 0, then f (t )i (θ ) = 0
for t ≥ T , and if L(θ ) > 0, then f (t )i (θ ) > 0 for all t ≥ 0.
Proof. If L(θ ) > 0, then f (0)i (θ ) > 0 for all i . The desired result follows from the formula in
Proposition 4.5. Now suppose that L(θ ) = 0. Let T be large enough so that P (t )i j > 0 for all i, j and
t ≥ T . Because f (0)j (θ ) = 0 for some j , f (t )i (θ ) = 0 for all i and t ≥ T by the formula in Proposition
4.5. 
The next proposition gives an explicit formula for the ratio of beliefs at two different points,
highlighting the terms that become small in the limit. It is a crucial component that is used in
Section 5.2 to prove the Master Theorem 5.10.
Proposition 5.4. Let r = ρ(A) be the spectral radius of A, and v andw be the Perron vectors of A
and A⊤, respectively. Then there are ε (t )i, j → 0 as t →∞ such that for any θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ with L(θ2) > 0,
f
(t )
i (θ1)
f
(t )
i (θ2)
=
f∗(θ1)
f∗(θ2)

N∏
j=1
(
д
(0)
j (θ1)
д
(0)
j (θ2)
)vj+ε (t )i, j 
wir
t /w⊤v
.
From this proposition, we can begin to see the weighted likelihood function take shape: in the
formula above, if the prior factors in front are ignored and the small terms ε
(t )
i, j disregarded, what
is left is the ratio L(θ1)/L(θ2) raised to some power.
Proof. The proof is essentially by direct computation. Note that f
(t )
i (θ2) > 0 by Lemma 5.3, so
the formula makes sense. By Proposition 4.5 for θ1 and θ2,
д
(t )
i (θ1)
д
(t )
i (θ2)
=
N∏
j=1
(
д
(0)
j (θ1)
д
(0)
j (θ2)
)P (t )j i
.
By Lemma 4.3, P
(t )
ji is the (j, i) entry of At . By Theorem 3.3, this quantity equals
r t
( (vw⊤)ji
w⊤v
+ δ
(t )
i, j
)
= r t
(vjwi
w⊤v
+ δ
(t )
i, j
)
,
where δ
(t )
i, j → 0 as t → ∞. The result follows by letting ε (t )i, j = δ (t )i, jw⊤v/wi and substituting these
all in. 
We can now show the “pointwise” concentration of beliefs at maximizers of L. This hints at the
actual concentration result in the next subsection.
Proposition 5.5. If θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ are such that L(θ1) < L(θ2), then as t →∞,
f
(t )
i (θ1)
f
(t )
i (θ2)
→ 0.
Proof. The proof is by directly applying Proposition 5.4. As t → ∞, the expression in the
bracket converges to L(θ1)/L(θ2) < 1, so this expression is smaller than some α < 1 for large t . By
Lemma 3.4, the exponent of this expression goes to infinity, so f
(t )
i (θ1)/f (t )i (θ2) → 0 as t →∞. 
5.2 Master Theorem
This is a technical section; its aim is to prove theMaster Theorem 5.10 which establishes concentra-
tion of beliefs in very general settings. In order to do this, subtle issues of convergence arise which
can be best dealt with using ideas from measure theory (e.g. Lebesgue’s dominated convergence
theorem). Even in the relatively benign setting Θ = N, these issues are not so easy to circumnavi-
gate. We first present the general idea of the Master Theorem. Suppose A ⊆ Θ and θ ′ ∈ Θ are such
that L(θ ) < L(θ ′) for all θ ∈ A. Thus, θ ′ “dominates” all ofA in the sense of the weighted likelihood
function. We hope that
∫
θ ∈A f
(t )
i (θ ) → 0 as t → ∞. Proposition 5.5 implies the pointwise result
f
(t )
i (θ )/f (t )i (θ ′) → 0 as t →∞. We would like to aggregate this pointwise result into∫
θ ∈A f
(t )
i (θ )
f
(t )
i (θ ′)
→ 0 (5)
(Prop. 5.7), so that wemay conclude
∫
θ ∈A f
(t )
i (θ ) → 0. To do so, we need to control the convergence
in Proposition 5.5; the convergence needs to be “uniform” in someway. It turns out that the correct
hypothesis is that the inequality L(θ ) < L(θ ′) holds when the exponents in L are slightly perturbed:
L(θ )д(0)i (θ )δi < L(θ ′)д(0)i (θ ′)δi for small δi > 0. As explained in Section 1.1, we can think of this
as θ ′ dominating A robustly, i.e. the domination does not fail even if the centralities of agents are
being slightly perturbed. Later we will offer an example where this robustness condition fails and
concentration also fails (Ex. 6.6), which shows that this hypothesis cannot be omitted.
After obtaining the bound (5), if Θ is discrete, i.e. Θ = N, then the obvious bound f
(t )
i (θ ′) ≤ 1
finishes the proof. But this is not so easy if Θ is continuous, i.e. Θ = Rk . In fact, if concentration is
to be true, it is likely that f
(t )
i (θ ′) → ∞ as t →∞ if θ ′ maximizes L, and so we cannot get from (5)
to the desired result directly. The second idea is to pick θ ′ that is not a maximizer of L and show
that f
(t )
i (θ ′) → 0 (which is likely to happen if concentration near the maximizer is to occur), which
will then allow us to get the desired result. To do this, we find a set B such that L(θ ) > L(θ ′) for all
θ ∈ B, i.e. now the set B dominates θ ′ instead. Then if the convergence is similarly controlled, we
should get ∫
θ ∈B f
(t )
i (θ )
f
(t )
i (θ ′)
→ ∞
(Prop. 5.9), which implies f
(t )
i (θ ′) → 0. Putting all of this together completes the proof.
To summarize, the mechanics of the Master Theorem are a two-step domination process. Sup-
pose that we have sets A and B and a point θ ′, such that θ ′ dominates A and B dominates θ ′, and
both dominations are robust. Then the latter domination forces the density at θ ′ to go to zero,
which, by the former domination, in turn forces the density on A to go to zero. To see how these
sets might be picked in actual situations, suppose Θ = R and L is continuous with a unique peak
at 0. Let A = [1, 2]. Then it might be possible to pick θ ′ = 1/2 and B = [−1/4, 1/4], i.e. we want
to pick B to be very close to 0, and θ ′ to be somewhere between A and B. This selection process
will be further automated in Section 6 to get results like Theorem 1.1 that can be directly used in
practice.
In what follows, we implement the program outlined above. First we formalize the notion of this
“robust domination” which allows us to control convergence. The following lemma is a purely an-
alytical statement that contains the essential ingredients to carrying out the “θ ′ dominatesA” part;
then Proposition 5.7 will actually carry it out. Throughout, we assume familiarity with Lebesgue’s
dominated convergence theorem and Fatou’s lemma.
Lemma 5.6. Let S be a measure space. For t ∈ Z≥0 and 1 ≤ i ≤ N , let ai , c : S → R≥0 be
measurable functions, rt > 0 and ε
(t )
i ≥ −1. As t → ∞, rt → ∞ and, for every i , ε (t )i → 0. The
functions ai has product A(x) :=
∏N
i=1 ai (x) ≤ 1 for almost every x ∈ S . Moreover, for every i , there
is δi > 0 such that A(x)ai (x)δi ≤ 1 for almost every x ∈ S . Suppose that for every t , the integral
It :=
∫
x ∈S
c(x)
(
N∏
i=1
ai (x)1+ε
(t )
i
)rt
< ∞.
Then, as t →∞,
It →
∫
A(x )=1
c(x) < ∞.
In particular, if A(x) < 1 almost everywhere, then It → 0 as t →∞.
Note that the form of It is reminiscent of the expression in Proposition 5.4 and indeed this is what
the lemma will be used for; but this abstraction in terms of these various variables is necessary in
order for the proof of the lemma to not become too large and convoluted.
Proof. We have
∏N
i=1 ai (x) = A(x). The first part of the proof is to show that if we perturb the
exponents of ai ’s a little, the result will still be close to A(x); specifically, it will be A(x) raised to
some power in a fixed range. To do this, the condition A(x)ai (x)δi ≤ 1 will be of help, along with
a series of algebraic manipulations.
All statements in this paragraph are meant to hold for almost every x ∈ S . For any 0 ≤ y < δi/2,
A(x)ai (x)y = A(x)1−y/δi (A(x)ai (x)δi )y/δi ≤ A(x)1/2,
because 1 − y/δi > 1/2. So if δ = minδi/2, then for any 0 ≤ y < δ , A(x)ai (x)y ≤ A(x)1/2 for all
i . This allows us to perturb one exponent. To perturb many exponents at once, note that for any
0 ≤ yi < δ/N ,
N∏
i=1
ai (x)1+yi =
N∏
i=1
(A(x)ai (x)Nyi )1/N ≤ A(x)1/2.
Now we extend to the case where the perturbations can be negative. Let 0 < δ ′ < 1 be such that
(1 + δ ′)/(1 − δ ′) = 1 + δ/N . Then for any |yi | < δ ′, if yj = minyi ,
N∏
i=1
ai (x)1+yi =
( N∏
i=1
ai (x)(1+yi )/(1+yj )
)1+yj
≤ A(x)(1+yj )/2 ≤ A(x)(1−δ ′)/2,
because 1 ≤ (1 + yi )/(1 + yj ) < 1 + δ/N . This gives us an upper bound. Finally, to get a lower
bound as well, because
∏N
i=1 ai (x)1+yi
∏N
i=1 ai (x)1−yi = A(x)2, for any |yi | < δ ′,
A(x)(3+δ ′)/2 ≤
N∏
i=1
ai (x)1+yi ≤ A(x)(1−δ ′)/2.
This final inequality is what we want: both upper and lower bounds for when all exponents are
perturbed at once, regardless of signs.
The second part of the proof is to use this bound to establish convergence. Let T be such that
for every i and t ≥ T ,
ε (t )i  < δ ′. Then, for t ≥ T , by the previous paragraph,∫
x ∈S
c(x)A(x)rt (3+δ ′)/2 ≤ It ≤
∫
x ∈S
c(x)A(x)rt (1−δ ′)/2.
Note that, as written, the right-hand expression may be infinite. The final step is Lebesgue’s dom-
inated convergence. Let
ft (x) = c(x)A(x)rt (3+δ ′)/2, дt (x) = c(x)A(x)rt (1−δ ′)/2.
Then fT ∈ L1 and ft ,дt → c1A(x )=1 pointwise a.e. as t → ∞. For large t , rt (1 − δ ′) > rT (3 + δ ′),
so ft ≤ дt ≤ fT pointwise a.e. Thus fT serves as the “Lebesgue dominant” in this argument.
By Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem, c1A(x )=1 ∈ L1 and
∫
x
ft ,
∫
x
дt →
∫
A(x )=1 c(x) as
t → ∞, so It converges to this same limit. 
To better understand how the proof of Lemma 5.6 works, one might want to carry it out in the
case where S = Nwith countingmeasure; in that case, the lemma is a statement about convergence
of infinite series. The proof in this special case does not require Lebesgue’s dominated convergence,
but still requires some thought on how to estimate the tails of the series. The authors of this paper
proved the lemma for this special case first before generalizing it to the present form; the final step
is the only part of the argument that needs nontrivial change.
Oncewe have Lemma5.6, Proposition 5.7 follows immediately, although it may be a little tedious
to check that all conditions are satisfied.
Proposition 5.7. Let A ⊆ Θ be a measurable set. Let θ ′ ∈ Θ be such that L(θ ′) > 0 and
L(θ ) ≤ L(θ ′) for almost every θ ∈ A. Moreover, for each i , there is δi > 0 such that L(θ )д(0)i (θ )δi ≤
L(θ ′)д(0)i (θ ′)δi for almost every θ ∈ A. Then there is 0 ≤ M < ∞ such that, as t →∞,∫
θ ∈A f
(t )
i (θ )
f
(t )
i (θ ′)
→ M .
If the set {θ ∈ A : L(θ ) = L(θ ′)} has measure zero, then M = 0.
Proof. All we have to do is to directly apply Lemma 5.6. Apply Proposition 5.4 to get the ex-
pression into the form
∫
θ ∈A
f∗(θ )
f∗(θ ′)

N∏
j=1
(
д
(0)
j (θ )
д
(0)
j (θ ′)
)vj+ε (t )i, j 
wir
t /w⊤v
.
Then apply Lemma 5.6 with S = A,
c(θ ) = f∗(θ )
f∗(θ ′)
, aj (θ ) =
(
д
(0)
j (θ )
д
(0)
j (θ ′)
)vj
, ε
(t )
j =
ε
(t )
i, j
vj
, rt =
wir
t
w⊤v
.
The hypotheses of the lemma are readily verified using the hypotheses of the proposition and
Lemma 3.4. 
The previous proposition completes the “θ ′ dominates A” part of the program. To carry out
the “B dominates θ ′” part, we prove the following Lemma 5.8 and Proposition 5.9, which can be
thought of as analogous versions of Lemma 5.6 and Proposition 5.7 but with reversed inequalities
and slight changes in details. In particular, the part that changes is the final step of the lemma
where here we use Fatou’s lemma to conclude instead.
Lemma 5.8. Let S,ai , c, rt , ε
(t )
i ,A and It be as in Lemma 5.6 with the following changes. The in-
equalities involving A are reversed: A(x) ≥ 1 for almost every x ∈ S , and for every i , there is δi > 0
such thatA(x)ai (x)δi ≥ 1 for almost every x ∈ S . Moreover, the integral It may be infinite. IfA(x) = 1
almost everywhere, then as t →∞,
It →
∫
x ∈S
c(x),
where the limit can be infinite. Otherwise, It →∞ as t →∞.
Proof. The first part of the proof stays the same. By an analogous argument to the one in
Lemma 5.6 with reversed inequalities, there are 0 < δ ′ < 1 and T such that, for t ≥ T ,∫
x ∈S
c(x)A(x)rt (3+δ ′)/2 ≥ It ≥
∫
x ∈S
c(x)A(x)rt (1−δ ′)/2.
To carry out the second part of the proof, use the following argument. The result is immediate
if A(x) = 1 almost everywhere. Otherwise, the right-hand integrand converges pointwise to a
function that is infinite on a set of positive measure. By Fatou’s lemma, the right-hand integral
converges to infinity. Then It →∞ as t → ∞. 
One can prove the following proposition by applying Lemma 5.8 in the same way that one
applies Lemma 5.6 to prove Proposition 5.7. So we omit the proof of the following proposition.
Proposition 5.9. Let B ⊆ Θ be a measurable set. Let θ ′ ∈ Θ be such that L(θ ′) > 0 and
L(θ ) ≥ L(θ ′) for almost every θ ∈ B. Moreover, for each i , there is δi > 0 such that L(θ )д(0)i (θ )δi ≥
L(θ ′)д(0)i (θ ′)δi for almost every θ ∈ B. Then there is 0 ≤ M ≤ ∞ such that, as t →∞,∫
θ ∈B f
(t )
i (θ )
f
(t )
i (θ ′)
→ M .
If B has positive measure, then M > 0. If {θ ∈ B : L(θ ) > L(θ ′)} has positive measure, then M = ∞.
From here it is easy to combine Propositions 5.7 and 5.9 into the Master Theorem. Recall that
the various technical hypotheses of the theorem should be intuitively read as “θ ′ dominatesA, and
B dominates θ ′ robustly in the sense of the weighted likelihood function,” as explained earlier in
this section.
Theorem 5.10 (Master Theorem). Let A,B ⊆ Θ be measurable sets, where B has positive mea-
sure. Let θ ′ ∈ Θ be such that L(θ ′) > 0, L(θ ) ≤ L(θ ′) for almost every θ ∈ A, and L(θ ) ≥ L(θ ′) for
almost every θ ∈ B. Moreover, for each i , there are δi , δ ′i > 0 such that L(θ )д(0)i (θ )δi ≤ L(θ ′)д(0)i (θ ′)δi
for almost every θ ∈ A and L(θ )д(0)i (θ )δ
′
i ≥ L(θ ′)д(0)i (θ ′)δ
′
i for almost every θ ∈ B. Suppose that either
{θ ∈ A : L(θ ) = L(θ ′)} has measure zero or {θ ∈ B : L(θ ) > L(θ ′)} has positive measure. Then∫
θ ∈A
f
(t )
i (θ ) → 0.
Proof. By Propositions 5.7 and 5.9, ∫
θ ∈A f
(t )
i (θ )∫
θ ∈B f
(t )
i (θ )
→ M1
M2
,
where M1 and M2 are limits in the two respective propositions. Because B has positive measure,
M2 > 0. Our final hypothesis implies that either M1 = 0 or M2 = ∞, so M1/M2 = 0. Then our
result follows from
∫
θ ∈B f
(t )
i (θ ) ≤ 1. 
6 CONVERGENCE OF BELIEFS
We apply the Master Theorem 5.10 to show convergence of beliefs of agents toward a point distri-
bution at the maximizer or near-maximizer of L. We establish separate results for the finite case
(Sec. 6.2), the infinite discrete case (Sec. 6.3) and the Rk case (Sec. 6.4). Our results in the Rk case
are the basis of Theorem 1.1. Results in this section will be used in applications in Section 7.
We first explain the general idea of this section. Recall that to use the Master Theorem, for a
given set A, we need to find a point θ ′ that dominates A and a set B that dominates θ ′. What this
section aims to do is the following. First, for a given setA, the choice of θ ′ and B will be automated
and abstracted away from the user. Second, even the choice of A will be abstracted away, leaving
only the conclusion that “beliefs converge to a point distribution,” at least in the case of a unique
maximizer. The general idea is not hard, but the details can be quite formidable.
6.1 Preliminaries
First we need some preliminaries. This subsection presents the technical details in carrying out
the “automatically choosing θ ′ and B” part. Let Less sup = ess supθ ∈Θ L(θ ) ≤ ∞, that is, Less sup is
the smallestM for which {θ ∈ Θ : L(θ ) > M} has measure zero. Note that we can replace “ess sup”
by “sup” if Θ is infinite discrete or “max” if Θ is finite. The following proposition gives sufficient
conditions for beliefs to concentrate in places where L is near Less sup.
Proposition 6.1. Let 0 ≤ M < Less sup and let S = {θ ∈ Θ : L(θ ) > M}. Assume that for every i ,
д
(0)
i is bounded a.e. on Θ \ S . Suppose that one of the following holds:
(1) L is not constant a.e. on S and for every i , д
(0)
i is bounded below by a positive number a.e. on S ;
(2) there is a subset T ⊆ S of positive measure such that, for every i , д(0)i is constant on T .
Then, as t →∞, ∫
θ ∈S
f
(t )
i (θ ) → 1.
To better understand the above proposition, it will be useful to understandwhat roles the various
hypotheses play. The “bounded” and “bounded below by a positive number” hypotheses ensure
that the gaps between A and θ ′ and θ ′ and B are robust as needed in the Master Theorem 5.10.
Now we note that S dominates Θ \ S ; however, we still need to pick θ ′ and B out of S . There are
two ways to do this depending on the situation. First, think of Θ = R. In this case, if L is constant
on S , it will be hard to pick B that dominates θ ′ robustly; but we can do this otherwise. This is
condition (1) in the proposition. Second, think of Θ = N. In this case, even if S is a single point
(and so L is constant on it), it will be easy to pick θ ′ and B; but this case does not satisfy (1). This
is where condition (2) comes in. Putting all these details together gives us the proposition.
Proof. Note that S has positive measure by the definition of Less sup. Apply the Master Theorem
5.10 with A = Θ \ S . In the second case, we can pick any θ ′ ∈ T and let B = T . Now consider the
first case. First suppose that there is θ1 ∈ S that minimizes L in S . In this case we pick θ ′ = θ1; now
we need to pick B. Because L is not constant a.e. on S , {θ ∈ Θ : L(θ ) > L(θ1)} has positive measure.
By continuity of measure from below, there is M ′ > L(θ1) such that U = {θ ∈ Θ : L(θ ) > M ′}
has positive measure. Let B = U . Finally, suppose that there is no minimizer of L on S . Pick a
sequence θi ∈ S such that L(θi ) → infθ ∈S L(θ ). Define Si = {θ ∈ Θ : L(θ ) ≥ L(θi )}. Then
S = ∪iSi . By subadditivity of measure, one of Si has positive measure. Then for this i , pick j such
that L(θ j ) < L(θi ). Let θ ′ = θ j and B = Si .
The result now follows by applying the Master Theorem toA, B and θ ′ just chosen. To show the
existence of δi > 0, use the fact that L(θ )/L(θ ′) ≤ α < 1 for all θ ∈ A and д(0)i is bounded a.e. on A.
The existence of δ ′i > 0 is similar; in case (1) we use the fact that L(θ )/L(θ ′) ≥ β > 1 for all θ ∈ B
and д
(0)
i is bounded below a positive number a.e. on S . 
We now present the following example of a social network, which will be used in Examples
6.4 and 6.6. What this example is trying achieve is a network consisting of two people, but where
the strength of information flow on each edge can vary, i.e. a “weighted” social network. We can
generalize our model to allow for weighted edges, but we choose not to: it turns out that, at least in
this simple case, the weighted edges can be simulated by our unweighted network by using teams
of people to represent one person in the weighted case. The details are below.
Example 6.2. For a,b ≥ 1, we define the (a,b)-graph as follows. Let c = max(a,b). The graph
has 2c nodes, x1, . . . , xc and y1, . . . ,yc . There is an edge from xi to x j and from yi to yj if and
only if j − i ≡ 0, 1, . . . ,a − 1 (mod c); there is an edge from xi to yj and from yi to x j if and only
if j − i ≡ 0, 1, . . . ,b − 1 (mod c). This graph is supposed to represent two people, x and y, with
self-loops at x and y each of weight a and an undirected edge from x to y of weight b. Let the xi ’s
and yi ’s have equal initial beliefs f
(0)
x and f
(0)
y , respectively. Then it is easy to see that the xi ’s and
yi ’s have equal beliefs throughout, so we can just subscript with x and y. The weighted likelihood
function is then L(θ ) = д(0)x (θ )1/2д(0)y (θ )1/2. By Proposition 4.5, we can compute
f
(t )
x =
fθ ∗
(
д
(0)
x д
(0)
y
) (a+b )t /2 (
д
(0)
x /д(0)y
)(a−b )t /2∫
Θ
fθ ∗
(
д
(0)
x д
(0)
y
)(a+b )t /2 (
д
(0)
x /д(0)y
)(a−b )t /2 .
6.2 Finite Case
We now apply Proposition 6.1 to show convergence in the case where Θ is finite. The theorem in
this case is quite easy and we can appeal to either case (2) of Proposition 6.1 or just Proposition
5.5.
Theorem 6.3. Assume that Θ is finite and the initial condition is feasible. Let θmax be the set of
points that maximize L. Then as t →∞, ∑
θ ∈θmax
f
(t )
i (θ ) → 1.
In particular, if θmax consists of a single point, then f
(t )
i converges to the point distribution at that
point.
One may wonder what more can be said when θmax consists of several points. The following
example shows that the behavior can greatly vary: with two maximizers, the maximizers may
share a constant fraction of beliefs, the beliefs may converge towards one of the maximizers, the
fraction of beliefs between the maximizers may alternate between two different values, and the
beliefs may converge separately on odd and even time steps to both maximizers!
Example 6.4. Consider the (a,b)-graph of Example 6.2. Let the parameter space Θ = {0, 1} with
prior f∗ ≡ 1 and initial beliefs f (0)x (0) = α and f (0)y (0) = 1 − α , where 0 < α < 1. Then θmax = Θ,
and by the computation in Example 6.2,
f
(t )
x (0) =
1
1 + ((1 − α)/α)(a−b )t .
Wecan thus see the following behaviors. For (a,b) = (2, 1), f (t )x (0) is constant atα . For (a,b) = (1, 2),
f
(t )
x (0) alternates between α and 1 − α . For (a,b) = (3, 1), f (t )x (0) → 0 if α < 1/2 and f (t )x (0) → 1
if α > 1/2. For (a,b) = (1, 3) and α < 1/2, f (2t )x (0) → 0 while f (2t+1)x (0) → 1.
6.3 Infinite Discrete Case
We now move on to the theorem for the infinite discrete case, which follows from the second
case of Proposition 6.1. This is the first nontrivial case and contains hypotheses that the the initial
conditions have to verify in order for beliefs to converge.
Theorem 6.5. Assume that Θ is infinite discrete and the initial condition is feasible.
(1) Let L attain the maximum Lmax at the set of points θmax , ∅. Suppose that supθ<θmax L(θ ) <
Lmax and д
(0)
i is bounded on Θ \ θmax. Then as t →∞,∑
θ ∈θmax
f
(t )
i (θ ) → 1.
In particular, if θmax consists of a single point, then f
(t )
i converges to the point distribution at that
point.
(2) If L does not attain a maximum, let Lsup = supθ ∈Θ L(θ ). For anyM < Lsup, if д(0)i is bounded on
{θ ∈ Θ : L(θ ) ≤ M}, then as t →∞, ∑
L(θ )>M
f
(t )
i (θ ) → 1.
The theorem is essentially saying the following. Note first that there are two separate cases. If
maximizers of L exist, then, assuming a “positive gap” condition and a “boundedness” condition,
beliefs converge to those maximizers. But if maximizers of L do not exist (for example, if L(θ )
increases to but is never equal to a positive number), then all that we can say is that the beliefs
concentrate at points where L are near the supremum, with a boundedness condition similar to
the first case.
We focus on the first case, i.e. when maximizers of L exist, and assume a unique maximizer. The
interesting question is whether these “positive gap” and “boundedness” conditions, which can be
traced back to the conditions in Proposition 6.1 and then the L(θ )д(0)i (θ )δi ≤ L(θ ′)д(0)i (θ ′)δi “robust
domination” hypothesis of the Master Theorem 5.10, are necessary. If they are, then, as alluded to
in Section 5.2, this shows that the robust domination hypotheses of the Master Theorem cannot be
omitted; in particular, they are not just an artifact of how we proved that theorem. The following
example shows that neither of the two hypotheses of the first case can be omitted. These examples
are rather delicate. Specifically, we know that the exponent in Proposition 5.4 grows like r t ; but in
order to construct these examples, the error term ε
(t )
i, j has to be estimated as well. This gives rise
to expressions like 4θ + 2θ+1.
Example 6.6. Counterexamples to the conclusion of the first case of Theorem 6.5 that satisfy only
the first and second hypotheses, respectively.
(1) This example satisfies the positive gap, but not the boundedness hypothesis. Consider the
(3, 1)-graph of Example 6.2. Let Θ = Z≥0, 0 < α < 1,
f∗(θ ) =
{
α , θ = 0
α4
θ
, θ ≥ 1 , f
(0)
x (θ ) ∝
{
1, θ = 0
α4
θ−2θ+1
, θ ≥ 1 , f
(0)
y (θ ) ∝
{
1, θ = 0
α4
θ
+2θ+1
, θ ≥ 1 .
The idea is to set things up in such a way that at round t , the parameter θ = t holds a nontrivial
fraction of beliefs. Then L(θ ) = αL(0) for all θ ≥ 1, so 0 uniquely maximizes L and the positive gap
condition is satisfied. We now compute
f
(t )
x (0) =
1
1 +
∑
θ ≥1 α (2
θ −2t )2−1 ≤
1
1 + α−1
< 1
for all t ≥ 1, so that beliefs do not converge to a point distribution at 0 and the conclusion of the
theorem does not hold.
(2) This example satisfies the boundedness, but not the positive gap hypothesis. Same as the
previous example but with the initial condition
f∗(θ ) =
{
1, θ = 0
α2
θ
, θ ≥ 1 , f
(0)
x (θ ) ∝
{
1, θ = 0
α4
−θ
+2θ−1
, θ ≥ 1 , f
(0)
y (θ ) ∝
{
1, θ = 0
α4
−θ
+2θ+1
, θ ≥ 1 .
It is easily seen that the boundedness condition is satisfied. Then L(θ ) = α4−θ L(0) for all θ ≥ 1, so
0 uniquely maximizes L. Similarly, beliefs do not converge to a point distribution at 0 because, for
t ≥ 1,
f
(t )
x (0) =
1
1 +
∑
θ ≥1 α2
θ
+4t−θ−2t ≤
1
1 + α
< 1.
Again, we set things up in such a way that the term with θ = t keeps the denominator large in
round t .
6.4 Rk Case
Finally, we deal with convergence in the most difficult case,Θ = Rk . Convergence here depends on
the topology of Rk , so we need to work with functions that are sufficiently continuous. Concepts
from real analysis will be freely used. Let A denote the closure of A and Br (a) the open ball of
radius r around a.
First we introduce the notion of piecewise continuity. Exactlywhy this is needed can be explained
as follows. If the initial beliefs are continuous, then this continuity allows us to establish conver-
gence quite easily. However, we may also be interested in densities that are not continuous, e.g. a
density that is 1 on [0, 1] and 0 elsewhere. But this density is actually continuous enough that we
can work with it; specifically, it is continuous on each of (−∞, 0), (0, 1) and (1,∞). Thus we turn
to the notion of piecewise continuity, which should include most densities in practice. There is no
universally agreed definition of piecewise continuity, so we define our own in Definition 6.7. On
R
k , this notion essentially means that there are disjoint open sets on each of which the function
is continuous. Moreover, these open sets must “fill up Θ,” in the sense that the portion of Θ not
contained in any of these sets has measure zero. Two extra conditions are needed in Definition 6.7
in order to avoid pathologies. The first condition excludes cramming open sets into small spaces,
e.g. if the function is continuous on each of (1/(n + 1), 1/n), this can cause problems near 0. The
second condition excludes functions with pathological behaviors at the boundaries, e.g. think of
sin(1/x) near 0.
Definition 6.7. LetΘ ⊆ Rk . A function f : Θ → R≥0 is piecewise continuous if there is a countable
collection of disjoint open sets Ui ⊆ Θ such that Θ \ ∪iUi has measure zero; only finitely many
Ui ’s intersect any given bounded set V ⊆ Rk ; and for each i , the restriction f : Ui → R≥0 can be
extended to a continuous function f˜i : Ui → [0,∞].
Note that the continuous extension mentioned in the last part of the above definition has the
interval in the extended real line [0,∞] as its range. This means that we allow functions such as
1/x to be piecewise continuous because it has a well-defined limit at 0, even though that limit
is infinite. The next lemma shows that multiple functions play well together with regard to this
definition: we can choose the open sets in the definition to be the same for all functions.
Lemma 6.8. Let Θ ⊆ Rk . For piecewise continuous functions f1, . . . , fN : Θ → R≥0, there are Ui ’s
as in Definition 6.7 that work for all of these functions.
Proof. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ N , let (U (i )j ) j≥1 be a collection of open sets that works for fi . It is
a simple exercise, although there are details to check, to show that the collection
(
U
(1)
j1
∩ · · · ∩
U
(N )
jN
)
j1, ..., jN ≥1 works for every fi . 
We now show convergence of beliefs when Θ ⊆ Rk and д(0)i is piecewise continuous. The fol-
lowing theorem can be regarded as the most significant result in this paper. Recall that we allow
initial beliefs to be piecewise continuous, which should include most situations in practice. More-
over, the parameter region Θ can be any subset of Rk ; e.g. Θ = (0,∞) is allowed. However, in the
case that Θ is a proper subset of Rk , the point that the beliefs converge to may be outside of Θ,
but it must be a limit point of Θ. This is not too surprising: if the initial beliefs are 1/x2 on (0,∞),
then it is likely that the beliefs will converge to 0, which is actually outside of the parameter set.
Nevertheless, our theorem is able to account for cases like this.
Theorem 6.9. Assume that Θ ⊆ Rk and the initial condition is feasible. Let д(0)i be piecewise
continuous. Let Less sup = ess supθ ∈Θ L(θ ) ≤ ∞, and for any M , let SM = {θ ∈ Θ : L(θ ) > M}.
Let θess sup be the set of all θ ∈ Θ such that for every M < Less sup and δ > 0, Bδ (θ ) ∩ SM has
positive measure. Suppose that there is r > 0 such that ess sup |θ |>r L(θ ) < Less sup. Moreover, there is
M ′ < Less sup such that for every M ∈ (M ′, Less sup), L is not constant a.e. on SM ; д(0)i is bounded a.e.
on Θ \ SM ; and д(0)i is bounded below by a positive number a.e. on SM . Then θess sup is a nonempty
compact set, and for any open set U containing θess sup, as t →∞,∫
θ ∈U∩Θ
f
(t )
i (θ ) → 1.
In particular, if θess sup consists of a single point, then f
(t )
i , viewed as a density on R
k that vanishes
outside of Θ, converges to the point distribution at that point.
The various hypotheses of the theoremfit together in the followingway. First, θess sup is supposed
to be the “maximizers of L,” except that there are two complications. One, wemust not be distracted
by sets of measure zero. Two, these maximizers may lie outside of Θ; think 1/x2 with Θ = (0,∞).
The definition in the theorem that captures both of these aspects is the following: the “maximizers”
are θ such that in small balls around θ , the set where L is near its essential supremum has positive
measure. Then to show that beliefs converge to a point distribution at θess sup (if it consists of a
single point), we require L to decay away at infinity, in the sense that the set where L is near
its essential supremum is bounded; this allows us to use compactness arguments. Then several
hypotheses on nonconstancy and boundedness from above and below are required in order to use
case (1) of Proposition 6.1. The conclusion is that beliefs concentrate in any open set containing
θess sup, and this shows convergence in the case where θess sup consists of a single point.
Proof. The proof is unfortunately rather technical. The first step is to show that θess sup is
bounded; for this, we use that L decays away at infinity. Take r such that ess sup |θ |>r < Less sup,
which exists by assumption. We will show that θess sup ⊆ Br (0). If ess sup |θ |>r L(θ ) < M < Less sup,
then SM has positive measure and SM \ Br (0) has measure zero. For any θ ∈ θess sup and δ > 0,
Bδ (θ )∩SM has positive measure by definition, so it follows that Bδ (θ )∩Br (0) has positive measure,
so θ ∈ Br (0). We conclude that θess sup ⊆ Br (0) is bounded.
The second step is to show that θess sup is compact. We have already shown it to be bounded, so
it remains to show that it is closed. By Lemma 6.8, we can take (Ui )i≥1 that works for all д(0)i . Then
note that L is piecewise continuous with the Ui ’s working for it as well. Assume that U1, . . . ,Un
are the only ones whose closures intersect Br (0); here we are using our definition of piecewise
continuity to only consider Ui ’s that are relevant. We now claim the following:
θess sup = ∪ni=1{θ ∈ Ui : L˜i (θ ) = Less sup},
where L˜i is the continuous extension of L on Ui . In other words, θess sup really consists of “max-
imizers:” θ ’s where L are equal to Less sup, but we need to first extend L onto the boundaries of
Ui ’s. Let θ ∈ Ui be such that L˜i (θ ) = Less sup. We will show that θ ∈ θess sup just by unpacking
definitions. For every M < Less sup, there is δ
′
> 0 such that Bδ ′(θ ) ∩ Ui ⊆ SM by continuity. So
for any δ > 0, Bδ (θ ) ∩ SM ⊇ Bδ (θ ) ∩ Bδ ′(θ ) ∩ Ui has positive measure because the latter is a
nonempty open set. Hence θ ∈ θess sup. Conversely, let θ ∈ θess sup. Then for every M < Less sup
and δ > 0, Bδ (θ ) ∩ SM has positive measure, so it intersects some Ui . For δ < 1, Bδ (θ ) ⊆ B1(θ ), so
there are finitely many possible choices ofUi ’s by the definition of piecewise continuity. Now pick
sequences M j → Less sup and δj → 0; then some choice of Ui must repeat infinitely many times.
Thus θ ∈ Ui for this i . Because θ ∈ Br (0), we have 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Finally, since we let M j → Less sup,
the fact that Bδj (θ ) ∩ SMj ∩Ui , ∅ implies that L˜i (θ ) ≥ Less sup. But if L˜i (θ ) > Less sup, then there is
a nonempty open set on which L > Less sup, a contradiction. So L˜i (θ ) = Less sup, proving the claim.
It follows from the claim that θess sup is closed, so because it is bounded, it is compact.
We now show that whenever U is an open set containing θess sup, beliefs on U ∩ Θ tend to 1.
Our strategy is the following. Proposition 6.1 implies that for any M ′ < M < Less sup, as t → ∞,∫
θ ∈SM f
(t )
i (θ ) → 1. So it suffices to show that there is M ′ < M < Less sup such that SM \ U has
measure zero. To this end, note that for large M , this is equivalent to (SM ∩ Br (0)) \ U having
measure zero, which in turn is equivalent to (SM ∩ Ui ∩ Br (0)) \ U having measure zero for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n. Suppose the contrary. Then, for some i , there is an increasing sequence M j → Less sup
such that (SMj ∩Ui ∩Br (0)) \U has positive measure. Pick θ j ∈ (SMj ∩Ui ∩Br (0)) \U . Then θ j is a
bounded sequence inUi such that L(θ j ) → Less sup. We can pass to a subsequence and assume that
θ j → θ ∈ Ui . Then θ ∈ θess sup by the claim above, so θ j ∈ U for large j , a contradiction. Therefore
the desired integral converges to 1. This argument can also be modified to show that θess sup is
nonempty: take U = ∅ in the above argument, note that SM \U = SM has positive measure, and
run the argument to construct θ ∈ θess sup as above. Alternatively, the fact that beliefs on U ∩ Θ
tend to 1 for any open U containing θess sup already implies that θess sup , ∅, because otherwise
the convergence should be true forU = ∅ as well.
Finally, to see that the distribution converges to the point distribution at θ if θess sup = {θ }, take
U = Bδ (θ ) for small δ > 0. 
Lastly, we present a simplified version of Theorem 6.9 when Θ = Rk and д
(0)
i is bounded and
continuous. This version can deal with densities that are continuous on the whole ofRk with some
mild decay conditions, and it is applicable to e.g. Gaussians and many similar densities. To prove
this corollary, we directly apply Theorem 6.9, where Corollary 4.14 is used to prove that the initial
condition is feasible.
Corollary 6.10. Assume that Θ = Rk . Let д
(0)
i be bounded continuous functions. Suppose that
there is a bounded set S such that supθ<S L(θ ) < supθ ∈Rk L(θ ). Then the initial condition is feasible, L
attains a maximum at the set of points θmax , ∅, and for any open setU containing θmax, as t →∞,∫
θ ∈U
f
(t )
i (θ ) → 1.
In particular, if θmax consists of a single point, then f
(t )
i converges to the point distribution at that
point.
Another (further simplified) version of Corollary 6.10 that should be useful in practice is Theo-
rem 1.1 in the introduction.
7 APPLICATIONS
We now seek to apply our theoretical results to model real-world situations. One example is given
for each of the cases where Θ is finite, infinite discrete, and continuous to demonstrate the use of
our theorems.
7.1 Binary Beliefs
Suppose that the underlying state of the world is binary, Θ = {0, 1}. For example, agents are trying
to determine the truth value of a statement. At first, agent i believes that the statement holds with
probability xi . By Theorem 6.3, we can conclude the following.
Proposition 7.1. Let the initial belief of agent i be Bernoulli distributed as Bern(xi ), 0 < xi < 1,
and the common prior be Bern(1/2). Then the initial condition is feasible. If∏ni=1 xvii > ∏ni=1(1−xi )vi ,
then f
(t )
i converges to the point distribution at 1; if
∏n
i=1 x
vi
i <
∏n
i=1(1− xi )vi , then f (t )i converges to
the point distribution at 0.
Note that, except in the borderline case
∏n
i=1 x
vi
i =
∏n
i=1(1−xi)vi , agents will reach a consensus
on whether the statement is true or false. This process can be viewed as if agents cast votes on
what everyone should believe: everyone will unanimously agree that the statement is true if
n∑
i=1
vi log
(
xi
1 − xi
)
> 0,
and that the statement is false if this expression is negative. Thus it is as if agent i casts votes of
log(xi/(1−xi)) in support of the statement and getsvi votes. The expression log(xi/(1−xi )), called
the log-odds, transforms probability in (0, 1) to the real line. Moreover, we can see that the strength
of an agent’s vote indeed comes from her confidence and her centrality.
A similar analysis holdswhen agents are trying to decide between a finite number of alternatives.
In this case, if agent i believes in alternative j with probability xi, j , then it is as if she casts votes
of logxi, j in support of alternative j . The alternative with the most votes becomes the consensus.
7.2 Poisson Beliefs
Now let us consider the case where there are an infinite number of alternatives, e.g. when the
underlying state of the world is the number of events in a time period. The initial beliefs can be
modeled by Poisson distributions.
Proposition 7.2. Assume that the initial belief of agent i is Pois(λi ) and the common prior is a flat
prior, then the initial condition is feasible. Let λ∗ =
∏N
i=1 λ
vi
i . If λ
∗ is not an integer, then f (t )i converges
to the point distribution at ⌊λ∗⌋. If λ∗ is an integer, then f (t )i lies in {λ∗− 1, λ∗} with probability going
to 1 as t →∞.
Proof. Since д
(0)
i is bounded and the initial condition is nondegenerate, the initial condition is
feasible by Corollary 4.14. It is easy to compute that
L(θ ) ∝ (λ
∗)θ
θ !
.
By direct computation, L has a unique maximum at ⌊λ∗⌋ if λ∗ is not an integer, and two maxima
{λ∗−1, λ∗} if λ∗ is an integer. Since L(θ ) → 0 as θ →∞ andд(0)i is bounded, we can apply Theorem
6.5 to show convergence. 
The Poisson parameter λ is the mean of Pois(λ) and is related to the average event rate. Our
result shows that agents will reach a consensus at λ∗, the weighted geometric mean of the rates
corresponding to agents’ beliefs, where again the weight of each agent is her centrality. Note that
our model indicates that Poisson rates should be combined multiplicatively rather than additively.
This accords with intuition: if two connected people believe that there will be 2 and 1000 floods
on average next year, respectively, then Proposition 7.2 says that they will come to believe that
there will be ⌊√2000⌋ = 44 floods. In contrast, combining rates additively as in DeGroot leads to
the counterintuitive answer of 501 floods. Thus, even though each agent carries essentially one
piece of information: the event rate, by modeling the beliefs according to the actual underlying
parameter space, our model leads us to a natural consensus. A similar situation is the Gaussian
belief case in the next section where beliefs converge to the weighted arithmetic mean and agent
i also has weight vi .
7.3 Gaussian Beliefs
Finally, we consider the interesting case of each agent carrying two pieces of information, her
belief and her confidence. Suppose that the underlying state of the world is Θ = R with the flat
prior f∗ ≡ 1. Each agent observes the true state of the world θ ∗ with Gaussian noise: agent i’s
signal µi is drawn from the normal distribution N(θ ∗, 1/τi ), where τi is the precision known to
agent i . Note that this is an example of an underlying scenario explained in Section 2.3, except
that the prior in this case is improper. Then agent i’s initial belief for θ ∗ (conditional on the signal
µi ) can be computed to beN(µi , 1/τi ).
Proposition 7.3. Assume that the initial belief of agent i is normally distributed as N(µi , 1/τi )
and the common prior is a flat prior, then this initial condition is feasible and f
(t )
i converges to the
point distribution at
θmax =
N∑
i=1
ci µi , ci =
viτi∑N
j=1 vjτj
.
Proof. The weighted likelihood function is
L(θ ) ∝ exp
[
−1
2
N∑
i=1
viτi (θ − µi )2
]
,
and we can see that this is proportional to a Gaussian with the maximum at θmax. Since д
(0)
i are
bounded and continuous and L decays quickly at infinity, the convergence follows from Corollary
6.10. 
If we interpret the initial belief N(µi , 1/τi ) as a scalar belief µi with confidence τi , then the
consensus belief θmax is the weighted average of agents’ signals µi with weights ci proportional to
her centrality vi and her precision τi . Therefore, an agent who is more centrally located and has a
more informative signal has more influence over the consensus belief. This phenomenon cannot
be captured by the standard DeGroot model which has no notion of quality of signals.
We can evaluate quality of learning by the variance of the consensus. This works as follows. The
consensus θmax is a function of the signals µi , and the signals are random, so the consensus can
be viewed as a random variable. Specifically, it is an unbiased estimator of the true state θ ∗, and
the lower its variance, the higher the quality of learning. Since µi ∼ N(θ ∗, 1/τi ) are independent,
θmax =
∑
i ci µi ∼ N(θ ∗, S) remains a Gaussian, with variance
S =
∑
i v
2
i τi
(∑i viτi )2 .
We now investigate the effect of increasing the precision τk on the variance S . We find that, all
other variables being fixed, the result depends on the threshold Vk = 2
∑
i,k v
2
i τi/
∑
i,k viτi of the
centrality vk . By direct computation, if vk ≤ Vk , then increasing τk always decreases S , while if
vk > Vk , then increasing τk decreases S only if τk ≥ (vk − Vk )
∑
i,k viτi/v2k and increases S oth-
erwise. Thus, increasing the precision τk usually decreases the variance and improves the quality
of learning, except when the centrality vk is high and the precision τk is low. This result has an
implication for social planners who want to encourage good learning. The social planner cannot
control the network structure vk but she might be able to control the signal precision τk . If an
agent is central but relatively uninformed, increasing the precision of that agent can reduce learn-
ing quality. An intuitive explanation might be that the agent now has some confidence to use her
centrality to impose her less informed opinion on the consensus. Only when that central agent
is sufficiently informed will additional precision improve learning quality. Therefore, if a social
planner wants to seed centrally located agents (opinion leaders) with new technologies, she must
invest enough resources to make those agents well informed; otherwise, the effort can backfire.
Note that we assume independence in the agents’ update rule, not in the initial signals them-
selves. Therefore, our framework can deal with arbitrarily correlated initial signals. In the case of
Gaussian beliefs, if we assume that the correlation of initial signals of agents i and j is ρi j , then
the consensus θmax is still unbiased with variance∑
i v
2
i τi + 2
∑
i<j vivj
√
τiτjρi j
(∑i viτi )2 .
This variance is increasing in every correlation ρi j , which indicates that higher correlations in
initial signals reduce learning equality, as expected.
Another point of interest is that our consensus does not depend on the geometry of the network
beyond the eigenvector centralities; this is true for all of our analysis from Section 5 onwards and
not only for this particular Gaussian case. Let us contrast this with the work of Banerjee et al. [5],
which also incorporates quality of signals into DeGroot learning. In their model, the quality of
signals is binary (informed/uninformed), and each agent takes the average of signals of only her
informed neighbors. They identify the clustered seeding problem: if the initially informed agents
are closely connected, some agents will “block” other agents, reducing the influence of the blocked
agents. To illustrate this point, consider a social network in the shape of an undirected cycle of
length N and assume that only three adjacent agents 1, 2, 3 are initially informed with the same
precision. In our model, the three agents’ signals have equal weights: c1 = c2 = c3 = 1/3. But in
their model, agent 2 is blocked by agents 1 and 3: c1 = c3 → 1/2 and c2 → 0 as the number of agents
N → ∞. Note that all three agents do have the same centralities and the same precisions, yet the
geometry of the network still allows them to block each other.Why this occursmay be explained as
follows: as the “informed segment” of the network expands, an agent who has just become newly
informed will get the opinion of agent 1 or 3 first. Surely she will not be very confident because
she has just heard of one opinion, but in the model of Banerjee et al. [5], her opinion counts as
much as everyone else, and so the opinions of agents 1 and 3 get injected back into the informed
segment and reinforce themselves to an inappropriate degree. In contrast, our model circumvents
this problem by allowing agents to express their confidence. Thus, a newly informed agent is not
very confident and her opinion counts less; and it turns out that this alone is enough to offset the
blocking disadvantage and allows the opinion of agent 2 to come through in the consensus. We
conclude that the clustered seeding problem occurs when agents can communicate whether they
are informed but cannot communicate precisions of their signals. When agents can communicate
precisions of signals, even if beliefs are naively updated, the problem disappears. The conclusion is
that it is of vital importance that agents be able to communicate opinions freely and expressively,
and not just state their beliefs, in order for blocking to not occur.
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